Domestic Assault Defence in Alberta

Domestic assault and intimate partner violence charges sit at the intersection of the criminal law, the Alberta Protection Against Family Violence Act, and a specialized Crown and court track that begins the moment police are called. The Alberta Crown Prosecution Service treats intimate-partner files as a distinct prosecutorial category, with no-contact conditions imposed at first appearance, Emergency Protection Orders moving in parallel through the civil track, and sentencing principles weighted heavily toward denunciation and deterrence. The defence work begins early and runs across both tracks at once.

The criminal side changed substantially in July 2026. Three federal Acts that came into force between July 15 and July 18, 2026 created a stand-alone intimate-partner violence offence (s. 263.1 of the Criminal Code), added a new reverse-onus trigger at bail for people bound by a peace bond, repealed the former enhanced-maximum rule for repeat intimate-partner offences, added a post-sentence no-contact order, and replaced the alternative measures provisions. Which of those changes applies to a given file depends on dates, and this page states the date for each.

This page sets out the statutory framework, including s. 263.1; the elements the Crown must prove; the operation of the EPO regime under the Protection Against Family Violence Act; bail; the substantive and Charter defences; companion charges; sentencing and the post-conviction collateral consequences; and the resolution pathways available — including peace bonds under ss. 810 and 810.03 of the Criminal Code, common law peace bonds, conditional discharges, and alternative measures. Companion charges (criminal harassment, uttering threats, mischief, breach of release order, non-consensual distribution of intimate image) frequently attach in this practice area and are linked through to dedicated pages on each.

Do Not Give a Statement Before You Speak with a Lawyer

Police investigating a domestic complaint will ordinarily attempt a recorded statement at the scene or at the detachment. Once a person is arrested or detained, s. 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects the right to choose whether to speak to the authorities (R v Hebert, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 151), and s. 10(b) gives the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to be told of that right. Officers are entitled to ask questions, but absent a statutory duty there is no general duty to answer police questions, whether or not a person is detained (R v Turcotte, 2005 SCC 50). Anything said becomes evidence the Crown can lead at trial, including statements that the accused believes are exculpatory or contextual.

Intimate-partner files often turn on competing accounts of a contested incident, and the value of an accused's pre-counsel statement to the defence is rarely positive. The disciplined response is to exercise the right to counsel, decline to answer investigative questions, and let counsel manage subsequent communication with police. Calgary Police Service and RCMP detachments will offer telephone access to duty counsel; private counsel can be retained on a 24-hour basis through this firm.

The July 2026 Amendments — Which Rules Apply to Your Case

Three Acts amended the parts of the Criminal Code that govern intimate-partner files: the Bail and Sentencing Reform Act (S.C. 2026, c. 11, in force July 15, 2026), An Act to amend the Criminal Code (S.C. 2026, c. 12, in force July 17, 2026), and the Protecting Victims Act (S.C. 2026, c. 19, in force July 18, 2026). Each change applies according to one of three dates:

• The date of the alleged offence. New offences and new elements reach only conduct on or after the date they came into force (s. 11(g) of the Charter), and an increased punishment cannot apply to an earlier offence (s. 11(i)). This governs the new s. 263.1 offence (conduct on or after July 17, 2026), its extension to criminal harassment and sexual offences (conduct on or after July 18, 2026), the consecutive-sentence rule in s. 718.3(4)(b)(iv) (offences on or after July 15, 2026), the post-sentence no-contact order in s. 729.2 and the prosecutor's duty in s. 752.01 (offences on or after July 18, 2026), and the new s. 162.1 maximums and threat-to-publish offence (offences on or after July 18, 2026).
• Cases already under way. The bail changes, the rewritten s. 810.03 peace bond, and the new alternative measures provisions in Part XXII.2 apply to cases already before the courts, whatever the date of the alleged offence. Parliament also directed that the new aggravating factor in s. 718.2(a)(viii) applies to pending matters; whether it can apply to an offence committed before July 15, 2026 may be contested.
• Not yet in force. The coercive control offence in s. 264.01 has been enacted but is not in force. It comes into force on June 18, 2028, or on an earlier date fixed by order.

Where the rule for an earlier offence differs, this page states both. The date range in the charge, and how the Crown has framed it, is one of the first things we review.

The Charge — The Assault Provisions and Section 263.1

There are now two ways an assault on an intimate partner can be charged. The first, and the only route for conduct before July 17, 2026, is one of the general assault provisions — most commonly s. 266 (simple assault), s. 267 (assault with a weapon, causing bodily harm, or choking, suffocating or strangling), or s. 268 (aggravated assault) — with the intimate-partner relationship treated as a statutory aggravating factor at sentencing under s. 718.2(a)(ii) and an additional consideration under s. 718.201. The second, for conduct on or after July 17, 2026, is the intimate-partner violence offence in s. 263.1, with the assault as the "included offence." The detailed structure of the assault provisions, the s. 265 definition, the elements of force without consent, and the leading authorities on each are covered on our assault charges page.

The penalty structure of the general provisions is: s. 266 is hybrid with a five-year indictable maximum and the default summary maximum of two years less a day; s. 267 is hybrid with a ten-year indictable maximum; s. 268 is a straight indictable offence with a fourteen-year maximum. None of the three carries a mandatory minimum.

The intimate-partner violence offence (s. 263.1). Section 263.1, added by S.C. 2026, c. 12, makes it an offence to commit any offence "in which violence is used, threatened or attempted against their intimate partner." "Intimate partner" includes a current or former spouse, common-law partner and dating partner (s. 2). Its main features:

• Higher maximums, keyed to the included offence (s. 263.1(3)). On indictment, the maximum steps up one level: five years where the included offence carries at least two but less than five years; 10 years where it carries five years or more but less than 10 (simple assault under s. 266, or uttering threats to cause death or bodily harm under s. 264.1(1)(a)); 14 years where it carries 10 years or more but less than 14 (s. 267); and life where it carries 14 years or more (s. 268).
• Mode of prosecution follows the included offence (s. 263.1(2)). The charge cannot proceed by indictment if the included offence is summary-only, or summarily if the included offence is indictable-only — so a s. 263.1 charge built on s. 268 proceeds by indictment.
• Everything else carries over (s. 263.1(4)). Any provision that would have applied to the included offence — including procedure, orders and consequences — applies to the s. 263.1 charge, subject to the higher maximum and the mode rule.
• Verdict and record. If the Crown proves the included offence but not the s. 263.1 offence, the accused may be found guilty of the included offence (s. 662(5.1)). On a finding of guilt under s. 263.1, the court endorses the included offence on the information or indictment (s. 726.11).
• Discharges. Section 730 does not permit a discharge for an offence punishable by 14 years or life. A s. 263.1 charge built on s. 267 or s. 268 therefore reaches that ceiling on indictment. How the bar operates where the Crown proceeds summarily can be argued.
• Criminal harassment and sexual offences. From July 18, 2026, s. 3.01 deems criminal harassment (s. 264) and any offence of a sexual nature to be offences in which violence is used for the purposes of s. 263.1. Harassment or a sexual offence against an intimate partner on or after that date can therefore be charged under s. 263.1. For conduct on July 17, 2026 alone, only an offence involving actual, threatened or attempted violence qualifies.
• The date of the conduct. Section 263.1 is a new offence. It cannot apply to conduct before July 17, 2026, and its extension to harassment and sexual offences cannot apply to conduct before July 18, 2026 (Charter s. 11(g)). Earlier conduct can only be charged under the general provisions.

Unlike the former enhanced-maximum rule it replaced (see the sentencing section below), s. 263.1 does not depend on a prior conviction: a first offence can be charged under it. Whether a file is charged under s. 263.1 or under the general provision with the relationship as an aggravating factor is a Crown charging decision, and it affects the maximum sentence, the availability of a discharge, and the collateral consequences discussed below. Conditional sentences under s. 742.1 remain potentially available for the general assault provisions — the 2022 amendments under Bill C-5 (S.C. 2022, c. 15) repealed, among others, the former bar on offences prosecuted by indictment with a maximum of 14 years or life (former s. 742.1(c)) and the bar on indictable offences with a 10-year maximum that involved bodily harm, drugs or a weapon, so neither aggravated assault under s. 268 nor s. 267 prosecuted by indictment is excluded as a matter of statutory ineligibility — and the 2026 amendments did not add s. 263.1 or the assault provisions to the list of offences barred from a conditional sentence.

Elements the Crown Must Prove

The Crown's burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the assault charged. For s. 266 simple assault, those elements under s. 265(1)(a) are: (1) the intentional application of force; (2) to another person; (3) without that person's consent. Recklessness as to consent is sufficient for the third element. The Crown does not need to prove injury — a slight unwanted touch satisfies the actus reus. For s. 267, the Crown must additionally prove either the use, threat, or carrying of a weapon (267(a)), or bodily harm (267(b)), or choking, suffocating, or strangling (267(c)). "Bodily harm" is defined at s. 2 of the Code as any hurt or injury that interferes with health or comfort and is more than merely transient or trifling; a frequently cited appellate application is R v Moquin, 2010 MBCA 22. For s. 268, the Crown must prove that the accused wounded, maimed, disfigured, or endangered the life of the complainant.

On a s. 263.1 charge, the Crown must prove every element of the included offence and, in addition, that violence was used, threatened or attempted against a person who was the accused's intimate partner. The relationship is an element of the offence, not only a sentencing fact, and the date of the alleged conduct must fall on or after July 17, 2026 (July 18, 2026 where the included offence is criminal harassment or a sexual offence).

In intimate-partner files the complainant is often the only Crown witness to the central event, with secondary evidence drawn from 911 audio, attending officers' observations, photographs of injuries, and any recorded statement the accused gave at the scene. The defence work focuses on whether the Crown's evidence, taken at its highest, proves each element beyond a reasonable doubt — and on the reliability and credibility of the complainant's account when measured against contemporaneous documentation, prior inconsistent statements, and the dynamic of the relationship as it appears in the disclosure record.

The Emergency Protection Order Framework

Alberta's Protection Against Family Violence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-27, operates in parallel with the criminal charge. It is a civil regime with significant operational consequences for an accused, and counsel needs to track both tracks from the outset.

"Family members" is defined at s. 1(1)(d) to include persons who are or have been married to one another, adult interdependent partners, persons who are or have been residing together in an intimate relationship, parents of one or more children regardless of marital status or whether they have lived together, persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, and children in the care or custody of those persons. The definition is broader than the relationship categories familiar from federal family law. "Family violence" at s. 1(1)(e) is itself broader than the Criminal Code's assault provisions, capturing intentional or reckless acts or omissions causing injury or property damage that intimidate or harm a family member, threatened acts creating reasonable fear of property damage or injury, forced confinement, sexual abuse, and stalking. Stalking is defined at s. 1(1)(k.1) as repeated conduct, without lawful excuse or authority, that the person knows or reasonably ought to know is harassment of a family member and that causes a family member to fear for a family member's personal safety; under s. 1(2), that conduct includes following, communicating or contacting, being present at or watching a residence or place of work, threatening conduct, and any other behaviour a judge considers to be stalking.

An Emergency Protection Order is granted on application without notice to the respondent under s. 2(1) where the justice of the Alberta Court of Justice or the justice of the peace is satisfied of three findings: (a) that family violence has occurred; (a.1) that the claimant has reason to believe the respondent will continue or resume carrying out family violence; and (b) that by reason of seriousness or urgency the order should be granted to provide for the immediate protection of the claimant and other family members residing with the claimant. The factors at s. 2(2) include the history of family violence, controlling behaviour, escalation, immediate danger, the vulnerability of elderly claimants, the effect of exposure on any child in the claimant's care, the best interests of the claimant, and the claimant's need for a safe environment.

The available provisions of an EPO under s. 2(3) are extensive: restraining the respondent from attending at or near any specified place regularly attended by the claimant or other family members (including residence, property, business, school, or place of employment); restraining the respondent from communicating with or contacting the claimant and other specified persons (interpreted under s. 2(3.1) as prohibiting any means of communication including through third parties unless the order expressly provides otherwise); granting exclusive occupancy of the residence to the claimant for a specified period regardless of title or lease; directing peace officer removal of the respondent; directing peace officer accompaniment for the supervised retrieval of personal belongings; directing seizure and storage of weapons used or threatened to be used in family violence; and any other provision the justice considers necessary for immediate protection.

An EPO must indicate the date, time, and place at which the order is scheduled for review at a hearing by a justice of the Court of King's Bench, which under s. 2(6) may not be later than nine working days after the order is granted. At that review hearing under s. 3, the King's Bench justice considers all the evidence that was before the granting court and may allow additional evidence, and may revoke the order, direct an oral hearing, confirm the order (in which case it becomes an order of the Court of King's Bench), or revoke the EPO and grant a King's Bench protection order under s. 4. The s. 2(6) review is the first meaningful opportunity to challenge an ex parte EPO, and counsel's preparation for that hearing — affidavit evidence, cross-examination strategy, application materials — is where much of the early work on a domestic file lives.

Two timing-and-notice rules carry consequences. Under s. 5(1), a provision of a protection order is not effective in relation to a person unless that person has actual notice of the provision — meaning a respondent cannot be in breach of an EPO they have not yet been served with or shown. Under s. 7, the duration of an EPO may not exceed one year, with King's Bench extensions of up to one year each on application.

Breach of an Emergency Protection Order

EPO breach is prosecuted in Alberta primarily under s. 13.1 of the Protection Against Family Violence Act. Section 13.1(1)(a) creates the provincial offence of contravening or failing to comply with a provision of a protection order (other than a provision under s. 4(2)(d) requiring monetary reimbursement) where the respondent has actual notice of the provision. The penalty structure escalates with prior breaches: under s. 13.1(2), a first offence carries a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment of not more than 90 days or both; a second offence carries imprisonment of not less than 14 days and not more than 18 months; a third or subsequent offence carries imprisonment of not less than 30 days and not more than 24 months. Section 13.2 provides peace officers with a warrantless arrest power on reasonable grounds to believe an offence under s. 13.1(1) has been committed.

In Alberta's general provincial practice, EPO breaches are laid as offences under PAFVA s. 13.1 rather than under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code. The Crown retains discretion to charge under s. 127(1) — the federal offence of disobeying a lawful order made by a court of justice — in exceptional, aggravating circumstances. Where the conduct is at the serious end of the scale, where there is a pattern of repeated breaches, or where the breach is combined with witness-tampering or other conduct undermining the administration of justice, the Crown may elect the s. 127 pathway. The Alberta Court of Appeal addressed sentencing on this exceptional pathway in R v Emmelkamp, 2013 ABCA 71, where, on a Crown appeal, the court substituted six months' imprisonment for disobeying a no-contact order under s. 127(1) and eighteen months consecutive for obstructing justice under s. 139(2), on a serious-end repeat-offender file in which the accused was bound by an EPO, a probation order and a bail order that all prohibited contact (paras 2, 27). Parallel charging under both s. 127 and PAFVA s. 13.1 on the same conduct is also operationally available — see R v Lauck, 2018 ABPC 260, where convictions were entered on both, with the Kienapple analysis left to sentencing.

An additional doctrinal challenge to s. 127 charging in this context remains preserved as a defence argument. Section 127(1) operates only where no "punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law" for disobedience of the order. The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Clement, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 468, held that "by law" in the exclusionary clause means by statute law, and that the test is whether statute law expressly provides another mode of proceeding. The Alberta Provincial Court in R v Creamer, 2001 ABPC 184, held that the Alberta Rules of Court then in force (including Part 52, since replaced by Alta Reg 124/2010) were sufficiently comprehensive to satisfy the exception for civil contempt — and expressly distinguished cases where the original order had been made under legislation containing express enforcement provisions. PAFVA s. 13.1 is exactly that kind of express statutory enforcement provision. The Court of Queen's Bench (now King's Bench), per Veit J., in Gauthier v Descoteaux, 2008 ABQB 148 — decided before s. 13.1 was enacted in 2011, while the EPO was also being enforced through civil contempt — flagged at paragraph 11, without deciding the question, that duty counsel at the upcoming bail hearing on a parallel s. 127 charge would be positioned to bring to the criminal court's attention the "other mode of proceeding expressly provided by law" that s. 127(1) appears to contemplate. The argument has not been resolved by any Alberta appellate decision on the record this firm reviews, and is properly raised in any s. 127 EPO-breach prosecution where the conduct equally engages PAFVA s. 13.1.

Bail and the Calgary Domestic Violence Track

Where the accused is held following arrest, the bail hearing under s. 515 of the Code proceeds at the Calgary Courts Centre at 601 5 Street SW, with after-hours hearings conducted by telephone or video from the Spyhill Arrest Processing Unit at 12500 85 Street NW. In intimate-partner files the Crown will typically seek conditions including no-contact with the complainant directly or indirectly, no-attendance at the complainant's residence and place of work, abstention from alcohol and non-prescribed drugs, and (where shared residency is at issue) a residence condition removing the accused from the family home. Whether the charge involves violence against an intimate partner is itself a factor the justice must consider (s. 515(3)(a)).

The weapons condition. On any charge of an offence involving violence against a person, s. 515(4.1) requires the justice to add a condition prohibiting possession of firearms, cross-bows, prohibited and restricted weapons, ammunition and explosive substances unless the justice considers it is not required for the safety of the accused, the complainant or anyone else — and a justice who declines to add it must give reasons (s. 515(4.12)). The justice must also specify how any firearms and licences are to be surrendered (s. 515(4.11)). This is a statutory default, not a matter of the Crown's request.

When the accused must justify release. In most cases the Crown must show why detention is justified. Several reverse-onus provisions put that burden on the accused instead, and in a reverse-onus hearing the accused must show cause by clearly demonstrating that their proposed release plan addresses the risks they pose (s. 515(6)). The ones that arise most often in intimate-partner files:

• Prior intimate-partner violence (s. 515(6)(b.1)(i)). The accused is charged with an offence involving violence against an intimate partner and has a prior conviction or discharge for such an offence against any intimate partner. Since July 18, 2026, s. 3.01 deems criminal harassment and sexual offences to be offences involving violence for this purpose, so a prior conviction for harassing a partner now counts.
• An existing peace bond (s. 515(6)(b.1)(ii)). Since July 17, 2026, the reverse onus also applies where the accused, at the time of the alleged offence, was bound by a peace bond under s. 810, 810.02, 810.03, 810.1 or 810.2 on an information laid on behalf of any intimate partner. Because a s. 810 peace bond is a common resolution of an earlier domestic file, this changes the advice at that earlier stage: while the bond is in force, any new intimate-partner charge carries a reverse onus at bail. On its face, the provision does not list the common law peace bond.
• Choking, suffocation or strangulation (s. 515(6)(a)(ix)). Since July 15, 2026, an indictable charge under ss. 266 to 268 that alleges the accused choked, suffocated or strangled the complainant carries a reverse onus.
• Repeat violent offences (s. 515(6)(a)(xii.1)). Since July 15, 2026, an indictable offence involving violence that would be the accused's third or subsequent violent indictable offence carries a reverse onus.

The 2026 bail changes apply to cases already under way, whatever the date of the alleged offence. The defence work at bail is to address the secondary ground (protection of the public, including the complainant) through sureties, programming commitments, and granular condition design — and to preserve the primary and tertiary grounds where they are also engaged. In a reverse-onus hearing, the release plan itself has to carry that weight.

Calgary operates a specialized docket for intimate-partner files within the Alberta Court of Justice, which conducts case management and resolution discussions on a denser schedule than the general docket. Files that resolve through a peace bond, a guilty plea to a lesser offence, or a Crown-directed diversion will typically do so on this track. Files that proceed to trial are committed out from the case management track to the general trial list. Because resolution discussions on this track begin early, the timing of disclosure review and of any defence position matters.

Defences

The defence framework in domestic assault cases turns on the same Charter and substantive defences that apply to any assault file, with particular factors that frequently engage in the intimate-partner context. On a s. 263.1 charge, the date of the alleged conduct and the relationship element are additional issues: the Crown must prove both.

Charter defences. Sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel) frequently anchor the early Charter work. Where police entry into a residence to attend a domestic complaint produces evidence later relied on by the Crown, the lawfulness of the entry — whether by consent, exigent circumstances, or some other recognized authority — is the first Charter question. Where the accused is detained and a statement is taken, the question is whether the right to counsel was facilitated without delay and whether the statement was voluntary at common law. Section 24(2) exclusion is the remedy where a breach is established and the R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 factors favour exclusion.

Self-defence under s. 34. Where the accused asserts that the application of force was a defensive response to the complainant's use or threat of force, the s. 34 framework is engaged. The provision sets out three elements at s. 34(1): (a) the accused believed on reasonable grounds that force was being used against them or another person, or that a threat of force was being made; (b) the act was committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (c) the act committed was reasonable in the circumstances. The Supreme Court in R v Khill, 2021 SCC 37 (Martin J. for the majority), described these three inquiries at paragraph 51 as the catalyst, the motive, and the response, and held at paragraph 39 that the 2013 amendments "broadened the scope and application of self-defence" and employ a multifactorial reasonableness standard.

The reasonableness analysis at the third element draws on the factors enumerated at s. 34(2)(a) through (h): the nature of the force or threat; the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether other means were available to respond; the person's role in the incident; whether any party used or threatened to use a weapon; the size, age, gender, and physical capabilities of the parties; the nature, duration, and history of the relationship between the parties, including any prior use or threat of force; any history of interaction or communication between the parties at s. 34(2)(f.1); the nature and proportionality of the response; and whether the act was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was lawful. The two relationship-history factors at s. 34(2)(f) and s. 34(2)(f.1) carry particular weight in the intimate-partner context, where the pattern of interaction and any prior violence in either direction is part of the reasonableness analysis the court is statutorily directed to consider.

Credibility, reliability, and the W.(D.) framework. In files turning on a single complainant's account against a contrary account from the accused, the R v W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 framework structures the trier of fact's analysis. The defence work is to surface the inconsistencies, contradictions, and external evidence that bear on the reliability of each account — recognizing that credibility findings are entitled to deference on appeal where the trial judge has correctly identified the burden and the standard.

Consent and the absence of force. Section 265(3) sets out the categories where no consent is obtained for purposes of an assault charge, including consent vitiated by force, threats, fraud, or the exercise of authority. In contested files the defence may engage the application of force itself — whether what the complainant describes amounts to force at all in law, or whether the contact was accidental, incidental to a different lawful activity, or wholly imagined.

Companion Charges

Intimate-partner files frequently attract additional charges arising out of the same incident or the broader pattern of conduct. Each carries its own statutory framework and potential collateral consequences, and the resolution strategy needs to engage all of them in concert. Any companion offence involving violence, threats or attempted violence against an intimate partner — and, for conduct on or after July 18, 2026, criminal harassment or a sexual offence against an intimate partner — can itself be charged under s. 263.1, with the higher maximum that brings.

Criminal harassment (s. 264). Section 264 was rewritten on July 18, 2026. For conduct on or after that date, the Crown must prove that the conduct — repeated following, monitoring, repeated communication, besetting or watching, or threatening conduct — could reasonably be expected, in all the circumstances, to cause the complainant to believe that their safety, including their psychological safety, or the safety of anyone known to them was threatened. For earlier conduct, the five-part test from R v Sillipp, 1997 ABCA 346, governs, including the requirement that the complainant actually and reasonably feared for their safety. Criminal harassment is a hybrid offence with a ten-year indictable maximum, rising to 14 years where harassment of an intimate partner on or after July 18, 2026 is charged under s. 263.1. A weapons prohibition is mandatory on any conviction or discharge (s. 109(1)(b)). Section 264 is only a secondary SOIRA offence, which engages solely where the Crown proves the offence was committed with the intent to commit a listed sexual offence. The substantive framework, including conduct that spans July 18, 2026, is covered on our criminal harassment page.

Uttering threats (s. 264.1). Threats to cause death or bodily harm under s. 264.1(1)(a), threats against property under (1)(b), and threats against animals under (1)(c) carry their own framework, with the leading authorities on the meaning of "threat" and the fault element in R v McCraw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72, R v Clemente, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 758, and R v McRae, 2013 SCC 68. A threat of violence against an intimate partner on or after July 17, 2026 can be charged under s. 263.1, where a threat under s. 264.1(1)(a) carries a 10-year indictable maximum in place of five. The full framework is covered on our uttering threats page.

Mischief to property (s. 430). Property damage in the course of a domestic incident — broken phones, damaged furniture, damaged vehicles — is commonly charged under s. 430(4) (mischief under $5,000) or s. 430(3) (mischief over $5,000), with the wilfulness requirement at s. 429(1) and the colour-of-right defence at s. 429(2). The framework is covered on our mischief page.

Intimidation (s. 423). Section 423(1)(a) creates a hybrid offence for the use of violence or threats of violence "to that person or their intimate partner or children" or injury to property, for the purpose of compelling another person to abstain from doing anything they have a lawful right to do or to do anything they have a lawful right to abstain from doing. The maximum on indictment is five years. The statutory language directly captures intimate-partner-targeted compulsion conduct, and the section can attach where the alleged threats are aimed at preventing the complainant from leaving the relationship, attending court, or accessing third-party support. Section 423(2) carves out attendance at or near a residence "for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating information" from the watching-and-besetting branch of the offence.

Non-consensual distribution of an intimate image (s. 162.1). Where the alleged conduct includes the publication, distribution, transmission, sale, making available, or advertising of an intimate image of the complainant without consent — or being reckless as to consent — s. 162.1(1) is engaged. The offence is hybrid. For offences on or after July 18, 2026, the indictable maximum is 10 years, or 14 years where the accused knew or ought to have known that an aggravated sexual assault was being, or had just been, committed against the person when the image was made; for earlier offences it is five years. The definition of "intimate image" in s. 162.1(2) was also widened for offences on or after July 18, 2026: it now covers a recording in which the person is nude, nearly nude, exposing their sexual organs (defined to include breasts that are or appear to be female breasts and the anal region) or engaged in explicit sexual activity, and a visual representation made by electronic or mechanical means — including artificial intelligence — that depicts an identifiable person in that way and is likely to be mistaken for a recording of them. For earlier offences, the former definition applies: a visual recording in which the person is nude, exposing their genital organs or anal region or breasts, or engaged in explicit sexual activity. Under either version, a recording must have been made in circumstances giving rise to a reasonable expectation of privacy, which the person still retains at the time of the offence. A new offence in s. 162.1(1.1) makes it an offence, on or after July 18, 2026, to threaten to publish or distribute an intimate image, with intent to intimidate or to be taken seriously (10-year indictable maximum). A public-good defence is available under s. 162.1(3); the s. 162.1(4) framework treats the question whether conduct serves the public good as a question of law, the question whether it extends beyond what serves the public good as a question of fact, and renders the accused's motives irrelevant. Three collateral consequences attach. First, s. 162.1(1) is a primary designated offence for SOIRA purposes at s. 490.011(1)(a)(x), and the new s. 162.1(1.1) is added at (a)(x.1) — the registration order is governed by the three-tier framework restructured by Bill S-12 (S.C. 2023, c. 28) in response to R v Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38: mandatory under s. 490.012(1) where the offence was prosecuted by indictment, the sentence is two years or more, and the victim is under 18; mandatory under s. 490.012(2) on the repeat-offender pathway; and presumptive under s. 490.012(3) in all other cases, subject to the offender establishing exemption on the statutory grounds. Second, s. 162.2 authorizes a discretionary order prohibiting the offender from using the Internet or other digital network on terms set by the court, for any period the court considers appropriate, including any period of imprisonment. Third, when prosecuted by indictment, s. 162.1 is a DNA secondary designated offence under s. 487.04 — meaning a DNA order may be made on Crown application where the court is satisfied it is in the best interests of the administration of justice under s. 487.051(3). The detailed sexual-offence framework, including the SOIRA three-tier framework and the s. 162.2 ancillary order, is covered on our sexual offence defence page.

Forcible confinement (s. 279(2)). Where the alleged conduct includes preventing the complainant from leaving — locking a door, blocking a doorway, restraining movement — s. 279(2) may attach. Forcible confinement is hybrid with a ten-year indictable maximum, and where the conduct is brief and incidental to the assault itself, the resolution analysis frequently addresses whether confinement is properly pleaded as a separate count or is subsumed by the assault.

Breach of release conditions (s. 145(5)). Once the accused is released on a bail order with no-contact and residence conditions, any breach — including a contact initiated by the complainant where the accused fails to terminate the interaction — is itself a criminal offence under s. 145(5), hybrid with a two-year indictable maximum. Section 145 breaches account for a substantial portion of the file activity in intimate-partner practice. The disciplined response to a complainant-initiated contact is documentary: written record of the attempted contact, immediate termination, immediate notice to counsel.

Coercive control (s. 264.01) — enacted, not in force. The Protecting Victims Act (S.C. 2026, c. 19, s. 28) enacted s. 264.01, an offence of engaging in a pattern of coercive or controlling conduct toward an intimate partner. It is a hybrid offence with a ten-year maximum on indictment. It is not yet in force: it comes into force on June 18, 2028, or on an earlier date fixed by order of the Governor in Council, and it cannot apply to conduct before then. Until then, conduct of that kind is prosecuted under existing offences — most often criminal harassment, uttering threats, intimidation and forcible confinement — and, since July 2026, potentially under s. 263.1. Separately, in Ahluwalia v Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16, the Supreme Court of Canada recognized a common-law tort of intimate partner violence, centred on coercive and controlling conduct that deprives a partner of autonomy, which can be shown by a pattern of abuse but also by a single act of violence. That is civil liability, separate from any criminal charge, and it can arise even where a criminal file resolves by peace bond, withdrawal or acquittal.

Homicide. This page does not cover homicide, but the 2026 amendments created intimate-partner-specific rules there as well: murder is first degree, whether or not planned and deliberate, where death is caused while engaging in a pattern of coercive or controlling conduct toward an intimate partner (s. 231(5.1)(a), for offences on or after July 18, 2026; a predecessor provision applied on July 17, 2026), and a court sentencing for manslaughter in those circumstances must consider a life sentence (s. 236(2)(a), for offences on or after July 18, 2026; a predecessor provision applied on July 17, 2026).

Sentencing After the 2026 Amendments

Sentencing in intimate-partner files is governed by the general principles in ss. 718 to 718.2, with three provisions specific to these files: s. 718.2(a)(ii) deems abuse of an intimate partner or family member an aggravating circumstance; s. 718.201 directs the court to consider the increased vulnerability of female victims, with particular attention to Aboriginal female victims; and s. 718.04 requires primary consideration to denunciation and deterrence where the offence involved the abuse of a person who is vulnerable because of personal circumstances, including because the person is Aboriginal and female. The 2026 amendments added the following:

• Repeat violence as an aggravating factor (s. 718.2(a)(viii)). An offence committed with the use of violence, threats or attempts of violence, by an offender convicted of one or more such offences within the previous five years, is now a deemed aggravating circumstance. Parliament directed that it applies to matters pending on July 15, 2026; whether it can apply to an offence committed before that date may be contested.
• Consecutive sentences (s. 718.3(4)(b)(iv)). For offences committed on or after July 15, 2026, a court sentencing for more than one offence must consider making the sentences consecutive where one of them involved violence and the offender has a conviction for such an offence within the previous five years.
• Higher maximums under s. 263.1. For conduct on or after July 17, 2026 charged under s. 263.1, the maximum steps up one level from the included offence, as set out above.
• Dangerous and long-term offender notice (s. 752.01). For offences on or after July 18, 2026, where the prosecutor considers that the offence is a serious personal injury offence committed against the offender's intimate partner or a family member, and the offender has at least two prior convictions for designated or serious personal injury offences against such a person, the prosecutor must tell the court before sentence whether it intends to apply for a dangerous or long-term offender assessment. The duty is to advise the court; it is not itself an application, and no designation follows from it.

The former enhanced maximum (s. 718.3(8)) and offences before July 17, 2026. Before July 17, 2026, s. 718.3(8) allowed a court sentencing an offender for an indictable offence involving violence against an intimate partner, where the offender had a previous conviction for such an offence, to exceed the ordinary maximum on the same stepped scale s. 263.1 now uses. S.C. 2026, c. 12 repealed s. 718.3(8) on July 17, 2026, without a transitional provision, and replaced it with s. 263.1. For an offence committed before July 17, 2026 and sentenced on or after that date, s. 11(i) of the Charter entitles the offender to the lesser of the punishments in force at the time of the offence and at sentencing, and s. 263.1, as a new offence, cannot reach the earlier conduct. The defence position is that for that window neither enhanced-maximum route is available. The Crown may argue otherwise; the point has not been decided.

Conditional sentences. Where a conditional sentence under s. 742.1 is available — across the s. 266 / s. 267 / s. 268 spectrum following Bill C-5, and on a s. 263.1 charge built on one of them — the sentence is served in the community on conditions, subject to the two-years-less-a-day ceiling, the s. 742.1(a) requirement that community service of the sentence not endanger the safety of the community, and consistency with the principles of sentencing under ss. 718 to 718.2. The conditional-sentence bars added in 2026 — s. 742.1(c)(ii.1) and (ii.2), (c.1) and (c.2), which apply to offences committed on or after July 15, 2026 (S.C. 2026, c. 11, s. 58(1)) — are directed at specified sexual offences and do not reach the assault provisions. The intimate-partner considerations at s. 718.2(a)(ii), s. 718.201 and s. 718.04 all weigh into whether a conditional sentence is appropriate in the particular case.

Collateral Consequences on Conviction

A conviction on a domestic assault charge carries consequences beyond the sentence itself, and they fall into two legally distinct families. The first is the ancillary orders the sentencing court imposes as part of the sentence — each with its own statutory test and each open to submissions at sentencing. The second is non-penal: consequences the conviction or the resulting record triggers under other regimes, which the criminal court does not impose, though their foreseeable severity can bear on the fitness of sentence. On a s. 263.1 charge, the orders and consequences that would have applied to the included offence carry over (s. 263.1(4)).

Firearms prohibition (ss. 109 and 110). Section 109 makes a weapons prohibition order mandatory on a conviction (or a discharge, where one is available) for an indictable offence involving violence against a person with a maximum of ten years or more (s. 109(1)(a)), and — whatever the maximum — for an indictable offence involving violence against the person's intimate partner, a child or parent of the person or of that partner, or anyone residing with them (s. 109(1)(a.1)). An intimate-partner assault prosecuted by indictment therefore attracts a mandatory order even under s. 266. On a first offence the order runs for at least ten years on ordinary firearms, crossbows, restricted weapons, firearm parts, ammunition and explosive substances, and for life on prohibited and restricted firearms, prohibited weapons, prohibited devices and prohibited ammunition (s. 109(2)); on a subsequent offence it runs for life (s. 109(3)). Where s. 109 does not apply — most often where the Crown proceeds summarily — s. 110 requires the court to consider a discretionary order, which may run for life or any shorter period where violence was used, threatened or attempted against an intimate partner or family member (s. 110(2.1)). Surrender of any existing firearms and firearms licences follows the order.

Post-sentence no-contact order (s. 729.2). For offences committed on or after July 18, 2026, a court that sentences an offender for an offence committed against their intimate partner — or grants a conditional discharge with probation — may prohibit contact, including communication by any means, with any victim, witness or other person named in the order. The order may run for life or any shorter period, so it can outlast the sentence itself; it can be varied on application for changed circumstances; and breaching it is a separate hybrid offence with a two-year indictable maximum (s. 729.2(5)).

DNA order (s. 487.051). Section 267 (assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm) and s. 268 (aggravated assault) are primary designated offences for DNA purposes under paragraph (a) of the definition in s. 487.04, so a DNA order is mandatory, with no gross-disproportionality exception (s. 487.051(1)). Section 266 simple assault is a secondary designated offence listed by name (paragraph (c) of the definition), whether the Crown proceeds summarily or by indictment, so on Crown application the court may order a DNA sample where it is satisfied that is in the best interests of the administration of justice (s. 487.051(3)). A s. 263.1 charge carries over the designation of its included offence.

The consequences that follow are not imposed by the sentencing court; they flow from the conviction or the resulting record under other regimes.

Immigration consequences (IRPA). For a non-citizen, a conviction for any of the three assault offences may engage inadmissibility under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Section 36 of IRPA captures serious criminality (sentence of more than six months, or an offence punishable by a maximum of ten years or more), which applies to permanent residents and foreign nationals, and criminality (any indictable offence), which applies to foreign nationals only; IRPA treats a hybrid offence as indictable even where the Crown proceeds summarily. Because s. 263.1 raises the maximum for a simple assault from five years to ten, an assault charged under s. 263.1 reaches the serious-criminality threshold that the same assault charged under s. 266 does not. The Supreme Court's decision in R v Pham, 2013 SCC 15, recognized immigration consequences as a relevant collateral consequence to be weighed in sentencing, within the range otherwise available.

Employment, professional licensing, and US travel. A conviction for an offence of violence appears on criminal record checks ordinarily required for employment in regulated professions, child- or vulnerable-person-facing roles, financial services, and security clearances. US travel becomes uncertain on any conviction involving violence; a criminal waiver application through US Customs and Border Protection may be required.

Resolution Pathways

Not every intimate-partner file resolves at trial. Several alternative pathways may be appropriate depending on the strength of the Crown's case, the complainant's position, the accused's record, and the broader file dynamics.

Peace bond under s. 810. A common resolution pathway is a peace bond under s. 810 of the Code, on which the Crown withdraws the criminal charges and the accused enters into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period not exceeding twelve months, on conditions designed to address the complainant's stated fears. The basis is a reasonable fear that the defendant will cause personal injury to the person or to their intimate partner or child, or will damage their property. The defendant is not required to plead guilty or admit to any conduct; the bond is preventative rather than punitive. Breach of a s. 810 bond is prosecuted as a hybrid offence under s. 811. Since July 17, 2026, a s. 810 bond laid on behalf of an intimate partner also has a consequence at bail: if the person bound is charged with a new intimate-partner violence offence while the bond is in force, the reverse onus in s. 515(6)(b.1)(ii) applies (see the bail section above). That consequence should be part of the advice before a bond is entered.

Peace bond under s. 810.03 (fear of domestic violence). Section 810.03, rewritten by the Protecting Victims Act and applicable to cases already under way, is the peace bond specific to intimate-partner files. It is available where a person fears on reasonable grounds that the defendant will commit an offence causing personal injury to the defendant's intimate partner or child, or to a child of the intimate partner. The bond runs for up to 12 months, or up to two years where the defendant has a previous conviction for an offence involving violence against an intimate partner or the child of an intimate partner (s. 810.03(4)) — and since July 18, 2026, s. 3.01 counts criminal harassment and sexual offences as offences involving violence for that purpose. The justice may add conditions including attendance at a treatment program such as domestic violence counselling, geographic and no-contact conditions, abstention from alcohol and drugs, and electronic monitoring with the Attorney General's consent, and must consider a weapons prohibition, giving reasons if one is not added. A s. 810.03 bond laid on behalf of an intimate partner triggers the same bail reverse onus as a s. 810 bond.

Common law peace bond. A parallel resolution pathway is the common law peace bond, which Judge Fradsham of the Provincial Court of Alberta (now the Alberta Court of Justice) confirmed continues to exist in Alberta in R v Al-Mohamad, 2023 ABPC 42. The common law peace bond operates in parallel with the statutory pathways and differs in several respects: it is not based on a sworn information; its scope is broader, requiring only a reasonably apprehended breach of the peace rather than the narrower fear-of-personal-injury / property-damage test under s. 810; and it is not subject to the twelve-month statutory cap on s. 810 bonds. The court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there are reasonable grounds to suspect future misbehaviour. A breach of a common law peace bond has been treated as an offence under s. 127(1) of the Code (disobeying a court order), not under s. 811, which is limited to statutory peace bonds; Al-Mohamad itself left the mechanics of enforcement for a later case (para 48). The bail reverse onus in s. 515(6)(b.1)(ii) lists recognizances under ss. 810, 810.02, 810.03, 810.1 and 810.2; on its face it does not list the common law peace bond.

Conditional discharge under s. 730. Where the accused pleads or is found guilty and a discharge is consistent with the public interest and not contrary to the accused's interest, the court may order a discharge conditional on a probation order under s. 730. A conditional discharge avoids a conviction and the most acute collateral consequences associated with one, while imposing supervised conditions. A discharge is not available for an offence punishable by 14 years or life — which includes s. 268, and a s. 263.1 charge built on s. 267 or s. 268 — and a discharge still attracts the mandatory firearms prohibition where s. 109 applies. The Alberta Crown is generally resistant to conditional discharges in intimate-partner files absent significant mitigating factors and the absence of any aggravating factors of the kind weighted under s. 718.2(a)(ii) and s. 718.201.

Crown-directed diversion and alternative measures. For lower-end files with a first-time accused, no significant injury, and a supportive complainant position, the Crown may direct diversion through an alternative measures program. Since July 18, 2026, alternative measures are governed by Part XXII.2 of the Code (ss. 715.44 and following), which replaced the former ss. 717 to 717.4 and applies to cases already under way; existing measures are treated as Part XXII.2 measures. The conditions are carried forward in s. 715.49: the program must be authorized by the Attorney General or a provincial designate; the measure must be appropriate having regard to the accused's needs and the interests of the victim and society; the accused must be advised of the right to counsel, consent freely, and accept responsibility for the act or omission; the Crown must consider the evidence sufficient to proceed; and the prosecution must not be barred at law. Alternative measures cannot be used for a person who denies involvement in the offence or wants the charge dealt with by the court (s. 715.5), and an admission made as a condition of participating is not admissible against the person in any civil or criminal proceeding (s. 715.51). Part XXII.2 also requires the prosecutor, where it is appropriate and does not pose a risk to public safety, to consider a warning or a referral before commencing or continuing a prosecution (s. 715.48). Successful completion of the program — typically counselling, community service, and a letter of apology — results in the charges being withdrawn; if a charge is before the court, the court must dismiss it where it is satisfied the person fully complied (s. 715.52).

Where We Appear

We act on domestic assault and intimate partner violence files in the Alberta Court of Justice, the Court of King's Bench of Alberta, and the Court of Appeal of Alberta. From our Calgary office we travel to court in Airdrie, Cochrane, Canmore, Okotoks, Diamond Valley, Didsbury, Strathmore, Drumheller, Hanna, Brooks, Medicine Hat, Lethbridge, Fort Macleod, Taber, Pincher Creek, and Cardston, and we appear in matters arising on the Tsuut'ina, Siksika, and Kainai (Blood Tribe) Nations.

Speak with KJR Law

Intimate-partner files move quickly. The EPO regime, the bail conditions, the no-contact framework, and the Crown's domestic-track scheduling all operate on tight timelines that begin within hours of the initial police contact. Early counsel involvement allows the EPO review at the nine-working-day Court of King's Bench hearing to be properly prepared, allows bail conditions to be designed with reference to the realities of the file, and allows the resolution pathways to be evaluated against the strength of the Crown's case before positions harden.