Domestic Assault Defence in Alberta

Domestic assault and intimate partner violence charges sit at the intersection of the criminal law, the Alberta Protection Against Family Violence Act, and a specialized Crown and court track that begins the moment police are called. The Alberta Crown Prosecution Service treats intimate-partner files as a distinct prosecutorial category, with no-contact conditions imposed at first appearance, Emergency Protection Orders moving in parallel through the civil track, and sentencing principles weighted heavily toward denunciation and deterrence. The defence work begins early and runs across both tracks at once.

This page sets out the statutory framework, the elements the Crown must prove, the operation of the EPO regime under the Protection Against Family Violence Act, the substantive and Charter defences, the post-conviction collateral consequences, and the resolution pathways available — including peace bonds under s. 810 of the Criminal Code, common law peace bonds, and conditional discharges. Companion charges (criminal harassment, uttering threats, mischief, breach of release order, non-consensual distribution of intimate image) frequently attach in this practice area and are linked through to dedicated pages on each.

Do Not Give a Statement Before You Speak with a Lawyer

Police investigating a domestic complaint will ordinarily attempt a recorded statement at the scene or at the detachment. The right to silence under s. 7 of the Charter and the right to retain and instruct counsel without delay under s. 10(b) are engaged from the moment of arrest or detention. Officers are entitled to ask questions; the accused is not obliged to answer beyond confirming identity. Anything said becomes evidence the Crown can lead at trial, including statements that the accused believes are exculpatory or contextual.

Intimate-partner files often turn on competing accounts of a contested incident, and the value of an accused's pre-counsel statement to the defence is rarely positive. The disciplined response is to exercise the right to counsel, decline to answer investigative questions, and let counsel manage subsequent communication with police. Calgary Police Service and RCMP detachments will offer telephone access to duty counsel; private counsel can be retained on a 24-hour basis through this firm.

The Underlying Assault Provisions

"Domestic assault" is not a discrete offence in the Criminal Code. The charge is one of the general assault provisions — most commonly s. 266 (simple assault), s. 267 (assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm), or s. 268 (aggravated assault) — with the intimate-partner relationship treated as a statutory aggravating factor at sentencing under s. 718.2(a)(ii) and a mandatory additional consideration under s. 718.201. The detailed structure of the assault provisions, the s. 265 definition, the elements of force without consent, and the leading authorities on each are covered on our assault charges page.

For present purposes the operative penalty structure is: s. 266 is hybrid with a five-year indictable maximum and the post-Bill C-75 default summary maximum of two years less a day; s. 267 is hybrid with a ten-year indictable maximum; s. 268 is a straight indictable offence with a fourteen-year maximum. None of the three carries a mandatory minimum. Conditional sentences under s. 742.1 are potentially available across the full spectrum following the 2022 amendments under Bill C-5 (S.C. 2022, c. 15), which repealed the categorical bar on CSOs for indictable offences with a maximum of fourteen years or life — meaning aggravated assault under s. 268, despite its fourteen-year maximum, is no longer excluded from CSO availability as a matter of statutory ineligibility. Whether a CSO is appropriate in any given case turns on the s. 742.1 safety analysis and the principles of sentencing under ss. 718 to 718.2.

Elements the Crown Must Prove

The Crown's burden is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of the assault charged. For s. 266 simple assault, those elements under s. 265(1)(a) are: (1) the intentional application of force; (2) to another person; (3) without that person's consent. Recklessness as to consent is sufficient for the third element. The Crown does not need to prove injury — a slight unwanted touch satisfies the actus reus. For s. 267, the Crown must additionally prove either the use, threat, or carrying of a weapon (267(a)), or bodily harm (267(b)), or choking, suffocating, or strangling (267(c)). "Bodily harm" is defined at s. 2 of the Code as any hurt or injury that interferes with health or comfort and is more than merely transient or trifling; the leading case is R v Moquin, 2010 MBCA 22. For s. 268, the Crown must prove that the accused wounded, maimed, disfigured, or endangered the life of the complainant.

In intimate-partner files the complainant is often the only Crown witness to the central event, with secondary evidence drawn from 911 audio, attending officers' observations, photographs of injuries, and any recorded statement the accused gave at the scene. The defence work focuses on whether the Crown's evidence, taken at its highest, proves each element beyond a reasonable doubt — and on the reliability and credibility of the complainant's account when measured against contemporaneous documentation, prior inconsistent statements, and the dynamic of the relationship as it appears in the disclosure record.

The Emergency Protection Order Framework

Alberta's Protection Against Family Violence Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-27, operates in parallel with the criminal charge. It is a civil regime with significant operational consequences for an accused, and counsel needs to track both tracks from the outset.

"Family members" is defined at s. 1(1)(d) to include persons who are or have been married to one another, adult interdependent partners, persons who are or have been residing together in an intimate relationship, parents of one or more children regardless of marital status or whether they have lived together, persons related by blood, marriage, or adoption, and children in the care or custody of those persons. The definition is broader than the relationship categories familiar from federal family law. "Family violence" at s. 1(1)(e) is itself broader than the Criminal Code's assault provisions, capturing intentional or reckless acts or omissions causing injury or property damage that intimidate or harm a family member, threatened acts creating reasonable fear of property damage or injury, forced confinement, sexual abuse, and stalking. Stalking is defined further at s. 1(1)(k.1) and s. 1(2) and includes following, communicating or contacting, watching the residence or place of work, threatening conduct, and any other behaviour the court considers stalking.

An Emergency Protection Order is granted on application without notice to the respondent under s. 2(1) where the justice of the Alberta Court of Justice or the justice of the peace is satisfied of three findings: (a) that family violence has occurred; (a.1) that the claimant has reason to believe the respondent will continue or resume carrying out family violence; and (b) that by reason of seriousness or urgency the order should be granted to provide for the immediate protection of the claimant and other family members residing with the claimant. The factors at s. 2(2) include the history of family violence, controlling behaviour, escalation, immediate danger, the vulnerability of elderly claimants, the effect of exposure on any child in the claimant's care, the best interests of the claimant, and the claimant's need for a safe environment.

The available provisions of an EPO under s. 2(3) are extensive: restraining the respondent from attending at or near any specified place regularly attended by the claimant or other family members (including residence, property, business, school, or place of employment); restraining the respondent from communicating with or contacting the claimant and other specified persons (interpreted under s. 2(3.1) as prohibiting any means of communication including through third parties unless the order expressly provides otherwise); granting exclusive occupancy of the residence to the claimant for a specified period regardless of title or lease; directing peace officer removal of the respondent; directing peace officer accompaniment for the supervised retrieval of personal belongings; directing seizure and storage of weapons used or threatened to be used in family violence; and any other provision the justice considers necessary for immediate protection.

An EPO must indicate the date, time, and place at which the order is scheduled for review at a hearing by a justice of the Court of King's Bench, which under s. 2(6) may not be later than nine working days after the order is granted. At that review hearing under s. 3, the King's Bench justice considers all the evidence that was before the granting court and may allow additional evidence, and may revoke the order, direct an oral hearing, confirm the order (in which case it becomes an order of the Court of King's Bench), or revoke the EPO and grant a King's Bench protection order under s. 4. The s. 2(6) review is the first meaningful opportunity to challenge an ex parte EPO, and counsel's preparation for that hearing — affidavit evidence, cross-examination strategy, application materials — is where much of the early work on a domestic file lives.

Two timing-and-notice rules carry consequences. Under s. 5(1), a provision of a protection order is not effective in relation to a person unless that person has actual notice of the provision — meaning a respondent cannot be in breach of an EPO they have not yet been served with or shown. Under s. 7, the duration of an EPO may not exceed one year, with King's Bench extensions of up to one year each on application.

Breach of an Emergency Protection Order

EPO breach is prosecuted in Alberta primarily under s. 13.1 of the Protection Against Family Violence Act. Section 13.1(1)(a) creates the provincial offence of contravening or failing to comply with a provision of a protection order (other than a provision under s. 4(2)(d) requiring monetary reimbursement) where the respondent has actual notice of the provision. The penalty structure escalates with prior breaches: under s. 13.1(2), a first offence carries a fine of not more than $5,000 or imprisonment of not more than 90 days or both; a second offence carries imprisonment of not less than 14 days and not more than 18 months; a third or subsequent offence carries imprisonment of not less than 30 days and not more than 24 months. Section 13.2 provides peace officers with a warrantless arrest power on reasonable grounds to believe an offence under s. 13.1(1) has been committed.

In Alberta's general provincial practice, EPO breaches are laid as offences under PAFVA s. 13.1 rather than under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code. The Crown retains discretion to charge under s. 127(1) — the federal offence of disobeying a lawful order made by a court of justice — in exceptional, aggravating circumstances. Where the conduct is at the serious end of the scale, where there is a pattern of repeated breaches, or where the breach is combined with witness-tampering or other conduct undermining the administration of justice, the Crown may elect the s. 127 pathway. The Alberta Court of Appeal addressed sentencing on this exceptional pathway in R v Emmelkamp, 2013 ABCA 71, where the court imposed six months' imprisonment for an EPO no-contact breach under s. 127(1) combined with eighteen months consecutive for obstructing justice under s. 139(2), on a serious-end repeat-offender file. Parallel charging under both s. 127 and PAFVA s. 13.1 on the same conduct is also operationally available — see R v Lauck, 2018 ABPC 260, where convictions were entered on both, with the Kienapple analysis left to sentencing.

An additional doctrinal challenge to s. 127 charging in this context remains preserved as a defence argument. Section 127(1) operates only where no "punishment or other mode of proceeding is expressly provided by law" for disobedience of the order. The Supreme Court of Canada in R v Clement, [1981] 2 S.C.R. 468, held that "by law" in the exclusionary clause means by statute law, and that the test is whether statute law expressly provides another mode of proceeding. The Alberta Provincial Court in R v Creamer, 2001 ABPC 184, held that Part 52 of the Alberta Rules of Court was sufficiently comprehensive to satisfy the exception for civil contempt — and expressly distinguished cases where the original order had been made under legislation containing express enforcement provisions. PAFVA s. 13.1 is exactly that kind of express statutory enforcement provision. The Court of King's Bench (per Veit J.) in Gauthier v Descoteaux, 2008 ABQB 148, flagged at paragraph 11 — without deciding the question — that duty counsel at the upcoming bail hearing on a parallel s. 127 charge would be positioned to bring to the criminal court's attention the "other mode of proceeding expressly provided by law" that s. 127(1) appears to contemplate. The argument has not been resolved by any Alberta appellate decision on the record this firm reviews, and is properly raised in any s. 127 EPO-breach prosecution where the conduct equally engages PAFVA s. 13.1.

Bail and the Calgary Domestic Violence Track

Where the accused is held following arrest, the bail hearing under s. 515 of the Code proceeds at the Calgary Courts Centre at 601 5 Street SW, with after-hours hearings conducted by telephone or video from the Spyhill Arrest Processing Unit at 12500 85 Street NW. In intimate-partner files the Crown will typically seek conditions including no-contact with the complainant directly or indirectly, no-attendance at the complainant's residence and place of work, surrender of firearms and firearms licences, abstention from alcohol and non-prescribed drugs, and (where shared residency is at issue) a residence condition removing the accused from the family home. Section 515(6)(b.1) imposes a reverse onus where the accused is charged with an offence in the commission of which violence was used, threatened, or attempted against an intimate partner and the accused has been previously convicted of such an offence. The defence work at bail is to address the secondary ground (protection of the public, including the complainant) through sureties, programming commitments, and granular condition design — and to preserve the primary and tertiary grounds where they are also engaged.

Calgary operates a specialized docket for intimate-partner files within the Alberta Court of Justice, which conducts case management and resolution discussions on a denser schedule than the general docket. Files that resolve through a peace bond, a guilty plea to a lesser offence, or a Crown-directed diversion will typically do so on this track. Files that proceed to trial are committed out from the case management track to the general trial list. Counsel familiar with the track can move a file toward resolution more efficiently than file movement through the general docket allows.

Defences

The defence framework in domestic assault cases turns on the same Charter and substantive defences that apply to any assault file, with particular factors that frequently engage in the intimate-partner context.

Charter defences. Sections 8 (unreasonable search and seizure), 9 (arbitrary detention), and 10(b) (right to counsel) frequently anchor the early Charter work. Where police entry into a residence to attend a domestic complaint produces evidence later relied on by the Crown, the lawfulness of the entry — whether by consent, exigent circumstances, or some other recognized authority — is the first Charter question. Where the accused is detained and a statement is taken, the question is whether the right to counsel was facilitated without delay and whether the statement was voluntary at common law. Section 24(2) exclusion is the remedy where a breach is established and the R v Grant, 2009 SCC 32 factors favour exclusion.

Self-defence under s. 34. Where the accused asserts that the application of force was a defensive response to the complainant's use or threat of force, the s. 34 framework is engaged. The provision sets out three elements at s. 34(1): (a) the accused believed on reasonable grounds that force was being used against them or another person, or that a threat of force was being made; (b) the act was committed for the purpose of defending or protecting themselves or the other person from that use or threat of force; and (c) the act committed was reasonable in the circumstances. The Supreme Court in R v Khill, 2021 SCC 37 (Martin J. for the majority), described these three inquiries at paragraph 51 as the catalyst, the motive, and the response, and held at paragraph 39 that the 2013 amendments "broadened the scope and application of self-defence" and employ a multifactorial reasonableness standard.

The reasonableness analysis at the third element draws on the factors enumerated at s. 34(2)(a) through (h): the nature of the force or threat; the extent to which the use of force was imminent and whether other means were available to respond; the person's role in the incident; whether any party used or threatened to use a weapon; the size, age, gender, and physical capabilities of the parties; the nature, duration, and history of the relationship between the parties, including any prior use or threat of force; any history of interaction or communication between the parties at s. 34(2)(f.1); the nature and proportionality of the response; and whether the act was in response to a use or threat of force that the person knew was lawful. The two relationship-history factors at s. 34(2)(f) and s. 34(2)(f.1) carry particular weight in the intimate-partner context, where the pattern of interaction and any prior violence in either direction is part of the reasonableness analysis the court is statutorily directed to consider.

Credibility, reliability, and the W.(D.) framework. In files turning on a single complainant's account against a contrary account from the accused, the R v W.(D.), [1991] 1 S.C.R. 742 framework structures the trier of fact's analysis. The defence work is to surface the inconsistencies, contradictions, and external evidence that bear on the reliability of each account — recognizing that credibility findings are entitled to deference on appeal where the trial judge has correctly identified the burden and the standard.

Consent and the absence of force. Section 265(3) sets out the categories where no consent is obtained for purposes of an assault charge, including consent vitiated by force, threats, fraud, or the exercise of authority. In contested files the defence may engage the application of force itself — whether what the complainant describes amounts to force at all in law, or whether the contact was accidental, incidental to a different lawful activity, or wholly imagined.

Companion Charges

Intimate-partner files frequently attract additional charges arising out of the same incident or the broader pattern of conduct. Each carries its own statutory framework and potential collateral consequences, and the resolution strategy needs to engage all of them in concert.

Criminal harassment (s. 264). Where the alleged conduct includes repeated communication, following, watching the residence or workplace, or threatening conduct that causes the complainant reasonably in all the circumstances to fear for their safety, s. 264 of the Code is engaged. The five-part test from R v Sillipp, 1997 ABCA 346, governs in Alberta. Criminal harassment is a hybrid offence with a ten-year indictable maximum and a secondary designated offence for SOIRA purposes under s. 490.011(1) — meaning SOIRA registration may be ordered on the secondary pathway under s. 490.012(3) where the prosecution establishes that the offence had a sexual element. The substantive framework is covered on our criminal harassment page.

Uttering threats (s. 264.1). Threats to cause death or bodily harm under s. 264.1(1)(a), threats against property under (1)(b), and threats against animals under (1)(c) carry their own framework, with the leading authority on the mens rea and the meaning of "threat" in R v McCraw, [1991] 3 S.C.R. 72, and R v Clemente, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 758. The full framework is covered on our uttering threats page.

Mischief to property (s. 430). Property damage in the course of a domestic incident — broken phones, damaged furniture, damaged vehicles — is commonly charged under s. 430(4) (mischief under $5,000) or s. 430(3) (mischief over $5,000), with the wilfulness requirement at s. 429(1) and the colour-of-right defence at s. 429(2). The framework is covered on our mischief page.

Intimidation (s. 423). Section 423(1)(a) creates a hybrid offence for the use of violence or threats of violence "to that person or their intimate partner or children" or injury to property, for the purpose of compelling another person to abstain from doing anything they have a lawful right to do or to do anything they have a lawful right to abstain from doing. The maximum on indictment is five years. The statutory language directly captures intimate-partner-targeted compulsion conduct, and the section can attach where the alleged threats are aimed at preventing the complainant from leaving the relationship, attending court, or accessing third-party support. Section 423(2) carves out attendance at or near a residence "for the purpose only of obtaining or communicating information" from the watching-and-besetting branch of the offence.

Non-consensual distribution of an intimate image (s. 162.1). Where the alleged conduct includes the publication, distribution, transmission, sale, making available, or advertising of an intimate image of the complainant without consent — or being reckless as to consent — s. 162.1(1) is engaged. The offence is hybrid with a five-year indictable maximum or summary conviction. "Intimate image" is defined at s. 162.1(2) as a visual recording in which the person is nude, exposing their genital organs or anal region or breasts, or engaged in explicit sexual activity, with both a reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the recording and a retained reasonable expectation of privacy at the time of the offence. A public-good defence is available under s. 162.1(3); the s. 162.1(4) framework treats the question whether conduct serves the public good as a question of law, the question whether it extends beyond what serves the public good as a question of fact, and renders the accused's motives irrelevant. Three collateral consequences attach. First, s. 162.1 is enumerated as a primary designated offence for SOIRA purposes at s. 490.011(1)(a)(x) — the registration order is governed by the three-tier framework restructured by Bill S-12 (S.C. 2023, c. 28) in response to R v Ndhlovu, 2022 SCC 38: mandatory under s. 490.012(1) where the offence was prosecuted by indictment, the sentence is two years or more, and the victim is under 18; mandatory under s. 490.012(2) on the repeat-offender pathway; and presumptive under s. 490.012(3) in all other cases, subject to the offender establishing exemption on the statutory grounds. Second, s. 162.2 authorizes a discretionary order prohibiting the offender from using the Internet or other digital network on terms set by the court, for any period the court considers appropriate, including any period of imprisonment. Third, s. 162.1 sits as a DNA secondary designated offence for purposes of s. 487.04 — meaning a DNA order may be made on Crown application where the court is satisfied it is in the best interests of the administration of justice under s. 487.051(3). The detailed sexual-offence framework, including the SOIRA three-tier framework and the s. 162.2 ancillary order, is covered on our sexual offence defence page.

Forcible confinement (s. 279(2)). Where the alleged conduct includes preventing the complainant from leaving — locking a door, blocking a doorway, restraining movement — s. 279(2) may attach. Forcible confinement is hybrid with a ten-year indictable maximum, and where the conduct is brief and incidental to the assault itself, the resolution analysis frequently addresses whether confinement is properly pleaded as a separate count or is subsumed by the assault.

Breach of release conditions (s. 145(5)). Once the accused is released on a bail order with no-contact and residence conditions, any breach — including a contact initiated by the complainant where the accused fails to terminate the interaction — is itself a criminal offence under s. 145(5), hybrid with a two-year indictable maximum. Section 145 breaches account for a substantial portion of the file activity in intimate-partner practice. The disciplined response to a complainant-initiated contact is documentary: written record of the attempted contact, immediate termination, immediate notice to counsel.

Collateral Consequences on Conviction

A conviction on a domestic assault charge carries consequences beyond the sentence itself, and they fall into two legally distinct families. The first is the ancillary orders the sentencing court imposes as part of the sentence — each with its own statutory test and each open to submissions at sentencing. The second is non-penal: consequences the conviction or the resulting record triggers under other regimes, which the criminal court does not impose, though their foreseeable severity can bear on the fitness of sentence.

Firearms prohibition (ss. 109 and 110). Section 109 imposes a mandatory firearms prohibition order on conviction for an indictable offence in the commission of which violence against a person was used, threatened, or attempted, where the maximum is ten years or more. Section 110 imposes a discretionary order in other cases. The s. 109 order runs for at least ten years on a first offence and for life on a subsequent offence in the case of firearms otherwise than under s. 91(1) and (2). Surrender of any existing firearms and firearms licences typically follows on conviction.

DNA order (s. 487.051). Section 267 (assault with a weapon or causing bodily harm) and s. 268 (aggravated assault) are primary designated offences for DNA purposes under s. 487.04 at subparagraphs (a)(ix) and (a)(x) respectively. On conviction, a DNA order is presumptively mandatory under s. 487.051 unless the court is satisfied the impact on the offender's privacy and security of the person would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest under the s. 487.051(2) exception. For s. 266 simple assault, no DNA order attaches as a matter of designation.

The consequences that follow are not imposed by the sentencing court; they flow from the conviction or the resulting record under other regimes.

Immigration consequences (IRPA). For a non-citizen, a conviction for any of the three assault offences may engage inadmissibility under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act. Section 36 of IRPA captures serious criminality (sentence of more than six months, or an offence punishable by a maximum of ten years or more) and criminality (any indictable offence). The Supreme Court's decision in R v Pham, 2013 SCC 15, recognized immigration consequences as a relevant collateral consequence to be weighed in sentencing, within the range otherwise available.

Employment, professional licensing, and US travel. A conviction for an offence of violence appears on criminal record checks ordinarily required for employment in regulated professions, child- or vulnerable-person-facing roles, financial services, and security clearances. US travel becomes uncertain on any conviction involving violence; a criminal waiver application through US Customs and Border Protection may be required.

A footnote on conditional sentences. Where a CSO is imposed under s. 742.1 — available across the full s. 266 / s. 267 / s. 268 spectrum following Bill C-5 — the sentence is served in the community on conditions, subject to the two-years-less-a-day ceiling, the s. 742.1(a) safety analysis, and consistency with the principles of sentencing under ss. 718 to 718.2. The mandatory and additional considerations at s. 718.2(a)(ii) and s. 718.201 (abuse of intimate partner) and at s. 718.04 (offences involving vulnerable persons, including Indigenous women and girls) all weigh into whether a CSO is appropriate in the particular case.

Resolution Pathways

Not every intimate-partner file resolves at trial. Several alternative pathways may be appropriate depending on the strength of the Crown's case, the complainant's position, the accused's record, and the broader file dynamics.

Peace bond under s. 810. A common resolution pathway is a peace bond under s. 810 of the Code, on which the Crown withdraws the criminal charges and the accused enters into a recognizance to keep the peace and be of good behaviour for a period not exceeding twelve months, on conditions designed to address the complainant's stated fears. The basis is the complainant's reasonable fear that the defendant will cause personal injury to them or their spouse or common-law partner or child, or will damage their property. The defendant is not required to plead guilty or admit to any conduct; the bond is preventative rather than punitive. Breach of an s. 810 bond is prosecuted as a hybrid offence under s. 811.

Common law peace bond. A parallel resolution pathway is the common law peace bond, which Judge Fradsham of the Alberta Court of Justice confirmed continues to exist in Alberta in R v Al-Mohamad, 2023 ABPC 42. The common law peace bond operates in parallel with the statutory pathway under s. 810 and differs in several respects: it is not based on a sworn information; its scope is broader, requiring only a reasonably apprehended breach of the peace rather than the narrower fear-of-personal-injury / property-damage test under s. 810; and it is not subject to the twelve-month statutory cap on s. 810 bonds. The court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities that there are reasonable grounds to suspect future misbehaviour. A breach of a common law peace bond is prosecuted under s. 127(1) of the Code as disobedience of a court order, not under s. 811 (which is limited to statutory peace bonds).

Conditional discharge under s. 730. Where the accused pleads or is found guilty and a discharge is consistent with the public interest and not contrary to the accused's interest, the court may order a discharge conditional on a probation order under s. 730. A conditional discharge avoids a conviction and the most acute collateral consequences associated with one, while imposing supervised conditions. The Alberta Crown is generally resistant to conditional discharges in intimate-partner files absent significant mitigating factors and the absence of any aggravating factors of the kind weighted under s. 718.2(a)(ii) and s. 718.201.

Crown-directed diversion and the Alternative Measures Program. For lower-end files with a first-time accused, no significant injury, and a supportive complainant position, the Crown may direct diversion through the Alternative Measures Program under s. 717 of the Code. Successful completion of the program — typically counselling, community service, and a letter of apology — results in the charges being withdrawn.

Where We Appear

We act on domestic assault and intimate partner violence files in the Alberta Court of Justice, the Court of King's Bench of Alberta, and the Court of Appeal of Alberta. From our Calgary office we travel to court in Airdrie, Cochrane, Canmore, Okotoks, Diamond Valley, Didsbury, Strathmore, Drumheller, Hanna, Brooks, Medicine Hat, Lethbridge, Fort Macleod, Taber, Pincher Creek, and Cardston, and we appear in matters arising on the Tsuut'ina, Siksika, and Kainai (Blood Tribe) Nations.

Speak with KJR Law

Intimate-partner files move quickly. The EPO regime, the bail conditions, the no-contact framework, and the Crown's domestic-track scheduling all operate on tight timelines that begin within hours of the initial police contact. Early counsel involvement allows the EPO review at the nine-working-day Court of King's Bench hearing to be properly prepared, allows bail conditions to be designed with reference to the realities of the file, and allows the resolution pathways to be evaluated against the strength of the Crown's case before positions harden.